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Abstract—Most proposals for security of vehicular networks
foresee the generation of a comparatively large number of
changing pseudonyms to prevent vehicles from being identified
or tracked. Most proposals rely on communication with backend
pseudonym providers to refill a vehicle’s pseudonym pool which
creates a number of problems, one being secure storage and
handling of a large amount of private key material. In this paper
we investigate the usage of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
and Public PUFs (PPUFs) instead of Hardware Security Modules
for this purpose. We describe a possible solution that uses PUF
and Fuzzy Extractors to provide the necessary stability.
Index Terms—Pseudonym, PUF, PPUF, Vehicular Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The world of Intelligent Transportation System is getting
closer to the deployment and requires security and privacy
mechanisms to ensure acceptance by users [1]. Vehicle-to-
Vehicle (V2V) communications enable vehicles to exchange
information about road conditions, such as accident or traffic
jam. As safety-related information has a potential impact
on traffic safety, this information must be secured [2]. A
mandatory mechanism is the authentication of the sender.
Indeed, receivers must be able to verify that the sender is an
authorized vehicle. Unfortunately, authentication mechanisms
break user privacy as every receiver learns the identity of
the sender. Therefore, a short-term credential –pseudonym–
should be implemented in order to prevent authentication to
ease vehicle tracking. In the current solution [2], pseudonyms
are first issued by a Certification Authority (CA)–also named
Pseudonym Provider (PP), so in the rest of the paper, we use
the terms CA and PP interchangeably. Then, pseudonyms are
used to sign messages until a pseudonym change is triggered
(on a fixed schedule, a random schedule, or triggered by Road-
Side Unit). When a vehicle is running out of pseudonym, it
requests a new set of pseudonyms to the PP. A solution to sim-
plify credentials management, and to reduce the burden on the
PP, is to allow vehicles to self-generate their own pseudonyms
and the corresponding key pairs. This eliminates the need of
pre-loading, storing, refilling, as well as obtaining pseudonyms
through infrastructure connectivity. Hence, the communication
overhead of pseudonym schemes would be reduced, as vehi-
cles do not have to contact the PP for pseudonym refill for
example. Self-generation of pseudonyms also improves the
system usability, as privacy is not compromised if the local
supply of pseudonyms is exhausted and it is not necessary
to over-provision a vehicle with pseudonyms [3]. To enable
self-generation, vehicles need a secret key. In this paper, we
investigate how Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) can be
used in the generation of secret keys, and especially in the
context of pseudonym generation.
Key Extraction from PUFs. As introduced by Pappu et
al. [4], [5], a PUF is a primitive that maps challenges Ci
to responses Ri, which depend on the physical properties
of the device in which the PUF is contained or embedded.
Physical Unclonable Functions have essentially two parts:
i) a physical part and ii) an operational part. The physical
part is a physical system that is very difficult to clone. The
operational part corresponds to the function. In order to turn
the physical system into a function a set of challenges Ci
(stimuli) has to be available to which the system responds
with a set of sufficiently different responses Ri. Examples of
PUFs include optical PUFs [4], [5], silicon PUFs [6], coating
PUFs [7], Intrinsic-PUFs [8], and LC-PUFs [9]. Regardless
of their particular instantiation, their unclonability, tamper
evidence and tamper resistance properties have made PUFs
very useful tools in Intellectual Property (IP) protection, device
authentication and secure key storage applications. A common
characteristic of PUF-based protocols [8], [10], [11] is the
derivation of a key(s) from the PUF, which is used to encrypt
(a piece of) IP and authenticate its origin. In this work we
focus on the key extraction for pseudonym and signature
computation. In [10], the authors observe that by using public-
key cryptography in combination with a PUF on FPGA, the
corresponding private-key does not need to ever leave the
FPGA, even during the enrollment stage, thus increasing the
security of the overall system.
The Need for a Fuzzy Extractor. Notice that PUF responses
are noisy by nature. This means, that two calls to a single
PUF with the same challenge Ci will output two different but
closely related responses Ri, R′i. The measure of closeness
can be defined via a distance function, e.g., the Hamming
distance. This distance function should be small for responses
from the same device and very large for PUF responses from
different devices. Since the plain PUF responses are noisy, they
cannot be used as a key. This means that the data encrypted
under response Ri cannot be decrypted with response R′i. In
order to derive reliable and uniform strings from (imperfect)
sources of randomness, such as a PUF, the concept of a fuzzy
extractor [12] or helper data algorithm [13] was introduced.
Thus, we obtain a secure master key from the fuzzy extractor.
This master secret key can be the source for a key derivation
scheme [14] to derive public/private key pair(s) which can then
be used as a pseudonym(s).
The application of PUF for in-vehicle security, and more
specifically secure key storage and component identification
for insurance application, was analyzed in [15]. We differen-
tiate from this work by focusing on PUFs use in pseudonym
scheme. Moreover, we complete their work by analyzing the
potential of PPUF [16] in vehicular networks.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II gives a short introduction of different pseudonym
schemes. Section III gives an overview of Physical Unclonable
Function and Fuzzy Extractor. Then, we investigate how
PUF and PPUF can be used for pseudonym generation in
respectively Section IV and Section V. Section VI concludes
this paper.
II. PSEUDONYM SCHEMES
Looking at the means of achieving pseudonymity, the
schemes differ in what cryptographic mechanisms they
employ. Four major categories can be distinguished for
pseudonymity in vehicular networks. Schemes based on asym-
metric cryptography aim for PKI-oriented privacy solutions.
Pseudonyms are typically represented by public key cer-
tificates without identifying information. To facilitate veri-
fication by receiving vehicles, pseudonym certificates must
be sent along with messages. Schemes based on identity-
based cryptography extend this idea but remove the need
of explicit public key certificates by deriving public keys
from identifiers. This reduces communication overhead for
pseudonym use but introduces new challenges for pseudonym
issuance. Pseudonym schemes based on group signatures
introduce one public key for a group of vehicles. Group-based
schemes reduce the need for pseudonym changes but pose new
challenges for pseudonym resolution and revocation. Schemes
based on symmetric cryptography are attractive because of
their computational efficiency, but must be cast into protocols
that can enable reliable authentication. Due to the different
challenges posed by each cryptographic paradigm, many solu-
tions combine different mechanisms to achieve more effective
schemes. In Sections II-A to II-D, we discuss the proposals
of each category and emphasize the need of a secure key to
generate pseudonym.
A. Asymmetric Cryptography Schemes
The first propositions to ensure privacy in vehicular net-
works were based on asymmetric cryptography [17], [18].
Afterwards, this approach has been followed by major ini-
tiatives such as the SeVeCom project [19], the IEEE 1609.2v2
standard [20], and the Car-to-Car Communication Consortium
[21]. Indeed, pseudonymous communication can be achieved
with traditional public key cryptography schemes (PKI) by
equipping vehicles with a set of public key certificates and
corresponding key pairs. The public key certificates are used as
unlinkable pseudonyms and, therefore, contain no identifying
information. Vehicles sign messages with the secret key of
the currently active pseudonym and attach the signature,
as well as the corresponding pseudonym certificate, to the
message. Receivers can verify a message signature based on
the pseudonym certificate, but are unable to determine the
sender’s vehicle identity. One could conclude that the central
challenge of asymmetric cryptography scheme is to have a
secure key.
B. Identity-based Cryptography Schemes
Identity-based cryptography (IBC) [22] is related to asym-
metric cryptography with the significant difference that a
node’s identifier functions as that node’s public key. A cor-
responding privacy key is derived from the identifier to sign
messages. To verify the signature, knowledge of the sender’s
identifier is sufficient. An explicit public key or additional
certificate are not required. However to prevent that any node
with knowledge of another node’s identifier can derive a corre-
sponding private key, only a centralized trusted authority with
full knowledge of system parameters is able to extract private
keys and assign them to nodes. Thus, a node’s authenticity
is implicitly guaranteed rather than explicitly stated with a
certificate, because only authorized nodes would receive a
private key corresponding to a specific identifier.
Compared to conventional PKI, IBC avoids the use of
certificates for public key verification and the exchange of
public keys and associated certificates, while providing similar
authentication characteristics. The resulting communication
and storage efficiency make IBC attractive for authentication
in vehicular communications. A drawback is the requirement
that a trusted authority must extract private keys from vehicle
identifiers rather than having vehicles generate their own key
pairs.
C. Group Signature Schemes
The downside of using a changing set of anonymous keys as
pseudonyms is the necessity for generation, delivery, storage,
and verification of numerous certificates for all pseudonym
public keys (or private keys in case of IBC). To mitigate this
overhead, Calandriello et al. [23] presented a first approach
that uses group signatures to enable vehicle OBUs to generate
and certify their own pseudonyms without interacting with the
CA. Basically, they used group signatures to support issuance
of traditional public key certificates. The group manager (GM)
is a new entity that sets group parameters, changes group
public keys, and may revoke anonymity if supported by the
scheme. In contrast to PP or CA, the GM role can be filled by
a vehicle and not necessarily a trusted third party. In any case
the GM has a key role in the key (pseudonym) generation.
D. Symmetric Cryptography Schemes
Symmetric cryptography is less flexible than asymmetric
cryptography when it comes to the realization of authentication
capabilities but is highly efficient in terms of computational
overhead. In symmetric schemes a (hashed) Message Authen-
tication Code ((H)MAC) is used for message authentication.
The signer hashes the message together with a secret key.
Any verifier must know the same secret key to verify the
MAC by performing the same operation on the message. As
a consequence, any node with knowledge of the secret key
can generate valid MACs, thus a node’s anonymity set would
extend to all nodes using the same secret key. However, sender
accountability is not provided as non-repudiation cannot be
achieved.
For inter-vehicle communication utilization of symmetric
authentication schemes offers the benefits of short generation
and verification time as well as less security overhead [24].
At the same time, the need for deployment and maintenance
of certification infrastructure and associated costs, as need for
asymmetric schemes, could be replaced by potentially simpler
key distribution. In a naı¨ve scheme, each OBU could have the
same secret key preinstalled, or even a set of shared secret
keys [25]. Due to the potential benefits, symmetric schemes
have been considered for VANET authentication. However,
reliable authentication requires that exposure of single secret
keys should not compromise authentication of all OBUs. This
requirement, paired with the desire for accountability, makes
actual symmetric authentication schemes more complex.
Based on the description of the four schemes, we conclude
that the generation of a secure key is the crucial phase
of a secure pseudonym scheme. In the next sections we
investigate the potential of PUFs and PPUFs for key extraction
in vehicular networks.
III. PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS AND FUZZY
EXTRACTOR
Figure 1 shows that with help of a PUF response, secret
key information can be generated. Each run of the PUF will
cause slight changes in the digitized output, resulting in a noisy
key. This means that the PUF only produces an approximation
of the response that is expected. Because we want to derive
cryptographic keys from the PUF responses, it is necessary
to make the PUFs output identical each time a challenge is
reused. A Fuzzy Extractor can be used to create a unique key.
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Fig. 1. Structure of key extraction
A. Physical Unclonable Function
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) as introduced in [4],
[5] is a primitive that is bound to a physical system and extracts
key information by mapping a set of challenges Ci to a set
of responses Ri. This challenge-response behaviour is highly
dependent on the physical properties of the device in which
the PUF is contained or embedded. PUFs consist of two parts:
i) a physical part, which is an intractably complex phys-
ical system that is very difficult to clone. It inherits
its unclonability from uncontrollable process variations
during manufacturing. For PUFs on an IC these process
variations are typically deep-sub-micron variations such
as doping variations in transistors.
ii) an operational part, which corresponds to the function.
In order to turn the physical system into a function a set
of challenges Ci (stimuli) has to be available to which the
system responds with a set of sufficiently different responses
Ri. The function can only be evaluated using the physical
system and is unique for each physical instance because of
process variations. Moreover, it is unpredictable even for an
attacker with physical access.
Silicon PUFs [6] (SPUFs), for example, generate their
responses based on the hidden timing and delay information of
integrated circuits. The variations in the manufacturing process
cause significant delay differences among different ICs, even
with identical layout masks. SPUFs are very sensitive to
environmental changes such as temperature and voltage. Thus
they are unsuitable to be used in a vehicle.
In the rest of this Section we summarize some known PUF
constructions that can be used in the context of pseudonym
generation in vehicles. These include: Coating PUFs, SRAM
PUFs, Bistable Ring PUFs and Public PUFs.
1) Coating PUF: Tuyls et al. [7] introduced the concept
of a Coating PUF (CPUF) where an IC is covered with a
protective coating. This coating contains random particles with
different dielectric constants at random positions. Figure 2
shows that below this coating the IC has an array of sensors
to measure the local capacitance of the coating. Due to the
randomness in the dielectricity of the coating particles, also the
capacitance will be random for every sensor. The authors [7]
show, that each sensor can extract up to three key bits. Instead
of using the challenge-response behavior of the PUF, the
coating can be used to store keys inside the IC rather than in
memory. Note that CPUFs need an additional manufacturing
step, but are very cheap to produce.
2) SRAM PUF: To overcome the disadvantage of additional
manufacturing steps the concept of Intrinsic PUF (IPUF) was
introduced. Guajardo et al. [8] present the first construction of
an IPUF based on the start-up values of the SRAM memory
already present on the device. Thus, the device does not need
any custom circuits or manufacturing steps to turn it into a
PUF. Note that SRAM memory is widely available in almost
every computing device. A SRAM cell is constructed by cross-
coupling two logic inverters. Such a circuit has two logically
stable states. Due to manufacturing variations there will be a
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Fig. 2. Schematic cross-section of a Coating PUF IC
mismatch between the two inverters, which will determine the
value of the power-up state of the SRAM cell. Each SRAM
cell is (heavily) biased towards zero or one. Different SRAM
cells will behave randomly and independently from each other.
We consider a range of memory locations within a SRAM
memory block as a challenge and the start-up values at these
locations as the response. SRAM PUFs are relatively stable to
temperature variations and robust over time.
3) Bistable Ring PUF: A Bistable Ring PUF (BR-PUF)
as introduced by Chen et al. [26] is another example of an
intrinsic PUF. The basic idea is similar to the SRAM PUF
which uses two cross-coupled inverters per SRAM cell. The
BR-PUF makes use of a ring of an even number of inverters.
This ring has two possible stable states. When powered up, the
ring falls into one of its two possible states, thus producing
a 1-bit output. This single ring can be turned into a BR-
PUF by duplicating the inverters and adding multiplexers and
demultiplexers between the stages. This allows an exponential
number of Challenge-Response-Pairs (CRPs). The BR-PUF is
a temperature sensitive PUF, but the authors claim, that with
additional hardware and protocol measures the problem can
be addressed. BR-PUFs are relatively reliable against aging.
4) Public PUF: A Public PUF (PPUF) as introduced by
Beckmann and Potkonjak [16] is a PUF that can be reverse
engineered and expressed as a function. The function charac-
terizes the PUF and thus it is possible to emulate the PUFs
behavior for a given input. The emulation needs to be slower
than the real-time behavior of the actual PUF. The PPUF char-
acteristic function plays the role of the public key. A holder
of the PPUF characteristics can choose a secret key sk and
some public parameters Ppub at random. With these parameters
as the input for the PPUF, the user calculates a public key
pk = PPUF(sk , Ppub) and sends the all public information to
the party holding the real PPUF. The holder of the real, fast
PPUF can then, with help of the public parameters, generate
the shared secret key sk = PPUF(Ppub, pk).
A similar concept to PPUF called “SIMulation Possible, but
Laborious” (SIMPL) is proposed by Ru¨hrmair [27]. SIMPL
systems are disordered, unclonable physical systems with a
complex input-output behavior. Similar to PPUFs, a SIMPL
system has a publicly known numeric description, which
allows everyone to simulate the systems output slowly. Only
the system holder can determine the output in a fast way with
help of the physical measurements.
B. Fuzzy Extractor
The responses of a PUF can not be used as a key (as in
e.g. [7]) in a cryptographic primitive for two reasons. First,
PUF responses are obtained through measurements which are
typically noisy. This leads to a problem since cryptographic
functions are very sensitive to noise on their inputs. Even
a single bit difference in the response cannot be tolerated.
Second, PUF responses are not uniformly distributed. Hence,
even if there was no noise, the response would not form
a cryptographically secure key. In order to deal with both
issues a Fuzzy Extractor or Helper Data algorithm has to
be used. For the precise definition of a Fuzzy Extractor
and Helper Data algorithm we refer to [12], [13]. A Fuzzy
Extractor deals with both issues by implementing first an
information reconciliation phase and second, by applying a
privacy amplification or randomness extraction primitive. In
order to implement these two primitives, helper data W are
generated during the enrollment phase. During this phase,
carried out in a trusted environment, a probabilistic procedure
called Gen is run. Later, during the key reconstruction or
authentication phase, the key is reconstructed based on a noisy
measurement r′ and the helper data W . During this phase,
a procedure called Rep is performed. We present one of the
constructions for such procedures previously described in [12],
[28]. Other constructions as well as constructions for other
metrics can be found in [12].
Construction Based on Code Offset. In order to implement
the procedures Gen and Rep an error correction code C and a
set H of universal hash functions [29] is required. The Gen-
procedure takes as input a PUF response(s) r and produces
as output a key K and helper data W = (W1,W2). This is
achieved as follows (cf. Figure 3(a)). First, a code word c← C
is chosen at random from C. Then, a first helper data vector
equal to d = c⊕r is generated and W1 is set to d. Furthermore,
a hash function hi is chosen at random from the set H and
the key K is defined as K ← hi(r). The helper data W2 is
set to i. During the key reconstruction phase (cf. Figure 3(b))
the procedure Rep is run. It takes as input a noisy response r′
from the same PUF and helper data W and reconstructs the
key K. This is accomplished according to the following steps:
1) Information Reconciliation (see Figure 3(b)):
a) Using the helper data W1, c′ = d⊕ r′ is computed.
b) The decoding algorithm of C is used to obtain c.
c) From c, r is reconstructed as r = d⊕ c.
2) Privacy amplification: The helper data W2 is used to
choose the correct hash function hi ∈ H and to recon-
struct the key as K = hi(r).
The security of the above constructions has been established
in [12], [13], [28], [30], [31]. By security here we mean two
complementary things. First, [12], [13] provide a bound on
the number of bits of entropy left after the fuzzy extractor
operates on the source bits of the PUF. Second, [28], [30], [31]
show that given the public helper data information, negligible
information is learned about the derived secret. Finally, [30],
[31] show how to protect the helper data against tampering
(a) Enrollment. (b) Key reconstruction.
Fig. 3. Phases of a Fuzzy Extractor.
and modification.
The first implementation of a Fuzzy Extractor on FPGA
was done by Bo¨sch et al. [32] who also provide explicit
constructions and investigate the hardware costs of Fuzzy
Extractors on FPGAs. Their results show, that implementing
a Fuzzy Extractor on an FPGA requires less than 450 Slices
and is thus feasible in practice.
IV. PUF FOR PSEUDONYM GENERATION
Now that we described pseudonym schemes in Section II
and PUF in Section III, we investigate how PUF could be used
in the pseudonym generation phase.
In the SeVeCom project [2], the CA generates a set of
pseudonyms for each vehicle. Each pseudonym contains an
identifier of the CA, the lifetime of the pseudonym, the public
key, and the signature of the CA, and thus, no information
about the identity of the vehicle. Pseudonyms are stored and
managed in the on-board pseudonym pool, with their corre-
sponding secret keys kept in the Hardware Security Module.
This ensures that each vehicle has exactly one key pair (its own
pseudonym and private key) that is active during each time
period. But this solution relies on a secure key storage, which
is expensive. Indeed, SRAM is already present in vehicles, and
therefore, the cost of a SRAM PUF is negligible. But beyond
the notable cost difference, the PUF is proved to be more
secure than an HSM [8], [31], [33]. Moreover, as an attacker
cannot tamper the PUF without breaking it, the authenticity
of the signer is always proved. The PUF can also be used
for IP Protection to ensure that in-vehicle components are
legitimate [15]. Thus, we propose to use a PUF in replacement
of an HSM for pseudonym generation.
Most of the public key schemes require a source of random-
ness for the generation of the key material. To be dependent
of the PUF, we can use a pseudo-random number generator
or a hash function with the PUF responses as an input
vector to generate randomness. This randomness is then the
input for the key generation of the used public key scheme
(e.g., HMQV [34]) to generate public/private key pair. Figure 4
depicts how a PUF participates in the pseudonym generation.
During the vehicle’s enrollment phase, the vehicle generates
its master secret key (msk ) with help of the PUF. From msk ,
the vehicle derives a master public key (mpk ) and sends it to
the CA. To create a pseudonym during the everyday driving
phase, the vehicle challenges the PUF to generate a random
private/public key pair (sk , pk ) that forms the pseudonym.
Then, the vehicle signs pk with its master secret key msk
and sends it to the CA. As the CA knows mpk , it can extract
pk and signs it, which creates the certificate of the pseudonym.
The CA stores the link pk -mpk for pseudonym resolution
phase. The certificate certsk is sent to the vehicle and proves
that (sk , pk ) is validated by the CA. The vehicle could sign
message with sk and appends certsk . As the certificate is
linked to the private key, only the owner of sk can use
certsk . This protects against Man-in-the-Middle attack, where
an attacker tries to steal certificate for example.
Vehicle CA
(sk , pk)← R pk−−−−−−−−−−→
certsk = Sign(pk)
(sk , pk , certsk )
certsk←−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 4. Simplified protocol: PUF used for key generation and certificate
distribution. The vehicles public key will be signed with msk before sending.
The CA is able to verify the received signature with mpk .
As one can see in Figure 4, the number of interactions
between the vehicle and the CA is limited. The vehicle
contacts the CA either for every pseudonym or for a set of
pseudonyms.
Moreover, as the vehicle generates its own pseudonyms, us-
ing PUF reduces the load on the CA. Therefore, the scalability
issue of one CA receiving requests of pseudonyms refill from
thousands of vehicles is improved. Regarding the vehicle’s
computation overhead, the generation time of a secure key
from a PUF is in the order of magnitude of 10−4 second [32]
and is considered negligible.
But the main benefit of using a PUF for pseudonym
generation is that this solution does not require a secure key
storage. Indeed, intrinsic PUFs (SRAM-PUF, BR-PUF) have
interesting properties for use in secret key generation and
storage. Since the key is generated from intrinsic randomness
introduced by inevitable manufacturing variability, no explicit
key-programming step is required, which simplifies key distri-
bution. Moreover, since this randomness is permanently fixed
in the (sub-)microscopical physical details of the chip, no
conventional non-volatile key memory is required. This also
offers additional security against probing attacks and possibly
other side-channel attacks, since the key is not permanently
stored in digital format, but only appears in volatile memory
when required for operation [35]. In our context of vehicular
networks, the key is generated on-the-fly when the vehicle’s
engine is started. Furthermore, since many cryptographic
security applications require a source of pure randomness,
any secure processor should implement some type of random
number generation algorithm on-chip. Hardware algorithms
have been proposed before [36], however it is also possible to
use the existing PUF circuitry to generate a random number
which is acceptable for cryptographic applications [37], [38],
and proved to be an efficient source of entropy for key
generation [39].
V. PPUF FOR PSEUDONYM GENERATION
A PPUF (or the related SIMPL system) extends the PUF
concept to allow public key cryptography [16], [27]. The
physical PPUF in this system represents the private key, while
a simulated representation of its characteristics serves as a
public key. The necessary asymmetry stems, e.g., from the
different time required to calculate the PPUF or the simulation
or some other intrinsic asymmetry. While PPUFs are in an
early stage of research, we assume existence of such a timing-
based PPUF as an asymmetric cryptographic primitive and
describe how it could be used for V2V security.
Vehicle CA
Request−−−−−−−−−−−→ sk , Ppub ← R
pk = PPUF(sk , Ppub)
sk = PPUF(Ppub, pk)
t||pk||Ppub||certsk←−−−−−−−−−−− certsk = Sign(pk)
(sk , pk , certsk )
Fig. 5. Simplified protocol: PPUF used for key generation and certificate
distribution. The CA will sign the message before sending to allow the
authentication by the client.
Such PPUF enables two parties A and B to exchange a
secret key. We assume that A is in possession of a PPUF. B
has a simulated version of A’s PPUF (also named PPUF char-
acteristic), and uses it to simulate its output for some input.
As the “simulated-PPUF” is slower than the real PPUF [16],
it is used as a resource testing mechanism to prevent spoofing.
Figure 5 shows in a simplified way how a PPUF can be
used for key generation and certificate distribution. Assume the
PPUF characteristic of the vehicle (i.e. the “simulated-PPUF”)
is only known by the CA. To issue a new pseudonym, the CA
selects a secret key sk at random and also chooses at random
some public parameters Ppub. The CA simulates the PPUF
with sk and the public parameters as the input. The output of
the PPUF is the public key pk = PPUF(sk , Ppub). The public
key pk is then signed with the master secret key of the CA
to create the certificate certsk linked to the secret key sk , and
thus, to the PPUF owner. Before sending the public parameters
for the new pseudonym to the vehicle, a time stamp t will be
included in the tuple. This will prevent replay attacks, where
an attacker resends an earlier eavesdropped message to the
vehicle. Then, the tuple (t||pk ||Ppub||certsk ) will be signed by
the CA and sent to the vehicle. After receiving a message from
the CA, the vehicle first checks the authenticity and integrity
of the message with help of CA’s signature and the time stamp.
If the message is accepted, the vehicle runs its PPUF with the
public parameters to generate the corresponding secret key
sk = PPUF(Ppub, pk) necessary for signing messages. This
process is used for every pseudonym used by the vehicle.
Depending on the scheme, either the CA or the vehicle can
trigger a pseudonym change. The tuple (sk , pk , certsk ) will
be the new pseudonym of the vehicle. As in the case of PUF,
the certificate certsk proves that (sk , pk ) is validated by the
CA. The vehicle can now sign messages with sk and append
certsk . As the certificate is linked to the private key, only the
owner of sk can use certsk .
The original concept of PPUF assumes that the PPUF
characteristics are public, and thus, everyone in possession
of the PPUF characteristics can generate (simulate) a key pair.
Even if an attacker creates a valid key pair, he cannot generate
a valid certificate corresponding to the generated secret key.
Also, an attacker cannot sign the tuple (t||pk ||Ppub||certsk )
on behalf of the CA.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
Vehicular networks require pseudonymous communication
to be accepted by users. To ensure pseudonymity, a key
needs to be generated in a secure manner. Therefore, in this
paper, we investigated the potential of Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) to generate pseudonym key pairs for vehicular
networks. After giving an overview of pseudonym schemes
and PUF, we discussed how PUF and Public PUF (PPUF) can
be used in the context of pseudonym generation, proposed a
protocol and analyzed the benefits and limits.
The challenge how to apply PPUF for broadcast authentica-
tion is left open and matter of our future research. Indeed, one
could envision to use the (P)PUF challenge/response mecha-
nism not only to generate pseudonyms but also to authenticate
messages. This may require an interactive protocol, which is
per se not suitable for broadcast communication. Moreover, if
every vehicle knows the PPUF characteristics, then the PPUF
owner will be always identified, which breaks its privacy and
the pseudonym scheme. A possible solution could be that
PPUF characteristics (Ppub) act as pseudonyms. Then, vehicles
publish a list of PPUF characteristics and have a strategy to
change it. We will investigate this in the next step of our
research.
Regarding a real experimentation of PUF in Vehicular
Networks, the PRESERVE Project1 is currently developing a
security ASIC that includes a Bistable Ring PUF [40] that we
plan to use to implement the proposed pseudonym generation
scheme in a real world system and to run benchmark.
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